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Negotiating Ḥalāl Consumption: The Interplay of Legitimacy, Trust, and 
Religious Authority1 
 






The term ḥalāl as used in the context of Europe’s food production industry is not congruent with 
the religious sense and the translation of the term as it is explained by Islamic legal scholars. In the 
food industry ḥalāl seems to represent a kind of religious branding, especially in non-Muslim 
societies, that indicates a product meets the dietary needs of a specific group, i.e., Muslims. This 
discrepancy in the way the term is used raises questions of religious authority, legitimacy, and trust 
among the actors involved. On the basis of an ethnographic case study conducted in Leipzig, a city 
located in Eastern Germany, this paper investigates how practicing Muslims negotiate ḥalāl-
complaint consumption in a non-majority Muslim society. By looking at the social and legal 
context in which Muslims are embedded, the paper argues that the legal constraints of ḥalāl 
slaughter in Germany, on the one hand, and the lack of centralized Muslim authority, on the other, 
influence Muslims’ consumption behavior. The paper concludes by arguing that the principle of 
trust seems to be the most important aspect when purchasing ḥalāl products and it can to some 
extent outweigh the legitimacy of the ḥalāl certificate. In addition, the paper delivers novel insights 
into the way Muslim actors negotiate normative orders (šarīʿa and state-centered law), especially 
the issue of ḥalāl and ‘ḥalālness’, within the complex context of a non-Muslim society. 
 
  
                                                 
1 We are very grateful to Marie-Claire Foblets, Farrah Raza, and Imad Alsoos for their helpful comments on the paper. 
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Settings: Konnex muslimischer Lebenspraxis zu islamischer Normativität” of the Department ‘Law & Anthropology’ of 
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1. Introduction  
 
Religious rules impact not only the ways people act and behave, but also the ways they consume 
food and drink. In Muslim-majority countries, when Muslims purchase food and drink, they 
usually do not think of the ‘ḥalālness’ of products because all products must be suitable for Muslim 
consumption. In non-Muslim majority countries, however, practicing Muslims are expected to 
think about whether the products offered in supermarkets meet Islamic dietary regulations (ḥalāl). 
The term ḥalāl derives from Arabic and means allowed or permissible. It is usually contrasted with 
ḥarām (forbidden). In Islamic legal theory, ḥalāl is one of the five normative guidelines (see Rohe 
2010: 10; Elliesie 2014a: 7) that are “intended to order the entire range of human activity and to set 
human life in good order” (Hallaq 2009: 19). It stands for all actions, ways of life, and objects that 
are lawful according to Islamic law. In everyday language ḥalāl is usually associated with meat 
slaughtered in compliance with Islamic dietary rules, which are mostly drawn from various verses 
in the Qurʾān.4 In non-Muslim societies, ḥalāl seems to represent a kind of religious brand that 
indicates a product meets the dietary needs of a specific group of followers, i.e., Muslims. Labeling 
products as ḥalāl “is not exclusively a religious act – it is also a commercial activity pursued by 
religious organizations, as well as by secular companies, for profit” (Raza 2018: 3). This double 
function of the ḥalāl label raises questions of religious authority, legitimacy, and trust among the 
actors involved.  
In Germany, ḥalāl-labeled products are not regularly found in mainstream supermarkets.5 
Instead, with a few exceptions, they are confined to the realms of specialty stores.6 For the 
individual consumer, the ‘ḥalālness’ of a product is not estimated on a scale; it is an all or nothing 
calculation. How a cow is raised and slaughtered, how the meat is packaged, stored, transported, 
and sold, are all supposed to be ḥalāl, which leaves potential unanswered questions for Muslim 
consumers who endeavor to consume ḥalāl products in Germany: Did the cow receive proper 
treatment? Who slaughtered it? Did the person perform all the necessary steps? Was the meat 
stored under ḥalāl conditions or was it possibly cross-contaminated in the cooling room? Did the 
meat travel a long way, or did the meat processing only happen in Germany? And does the store 
that offers the meat also sell alcohol? Questions like these could result in a Muslim consumer 
wanting to know more – to acquire valid knowledge about each step in the production chain. This 
desire is not an exclusive prerogative of the ḥalāl market. A quick look at the dairy section of any 
supermarket shows a variety of certificates and seals that provide information about working 
conditions, sustainability, treatment of the animals, production methods, etc. A ḥalāl certificate 
aims at providing knowledge to create trust in the religious legitimacy of the product and to 
                                                 
4 The Qurʾān: 2:168; 2:172; 2:173; 5:3; 5:87; 5:88; 5:93; 5:96; 6:118; 6:145; 16:115; 16:116 and 22:30.  
5 When ḥalāl products are explicitly or implicitly sold or marketed, the word can spark strong negative responses in 
certain sections of the German (online) society: see, e.g. media reports on reactions to ḥalāl meat sold at Edeka 
supermarkets (see the article on the fact-checking website Mimikama: Tom Wannenmacher, Wird bei Edeka nun Halal-
Fleisch verkauft? 10 March 2016. https://www.mimikama.at/allgemein/wird-bei-edeka-halal-fleisch-verkauft/ [accessed 
19.02.2020]) and reactions to implicit marketing to Muslims (see: Jule Schulte, Warum diese Katjes-Kampagne für 
Aufregung sorgt – und die Empörung schwachsinnig ist, Stern Online, 30 January 2018: 
https://www.stern.de/neon/wilde-welt/wirtschaft/katjes--aufregung-um-muslima-in-der-kampagne---ein-kommentar-
7844006.html [accessed 19.02.2020]). 
6 Wiesenhof, a German producer of poultry products, describes the certification processes on its website: 
https://www.wiesenhof-news.de/faq/ (accessed 19.02.2020). The supermarket Rewe informs its customers about ḥalāl 
consumption on its website: https://www.rewe.de/ernaehrung/halal/ (accessed 19.01.2020). In France and the UK ḥalāl 
meat is widely sold in mainstream supermarkets. Here, ḥalāl certifiers compete with each other, especially regarding the 
issue of non-stunned and pre-stunned slaughter (Lever and Miele 2012: 529, 535). 
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animate the consumer to make a purchase decision. The problem is that the certificates themselves 
might not be trusted because consumers do not possess knowledge about the certification process. 
By not trusting the certificate they withhold recognition of the religious authority of HCBs (ḥalāl 
certification bodies). In 2011, Johann Fischer described this dilemma as the “halal frontier”, which 
stands here for a “‘frontier of knowledge’ [which] indicates that a better understanding of halal 
materiality is required” (90). Because there is no religious authority that could provide guidance on 
how to navigate this frontier of knowledge present on the German ḥalāl market, a Muslim 
consumer seeking to comply with ḥalāl consumption in Germany may find him- or herself lost and 
without landmarks in the consumption procedure. She or he must develop her/his own set of 
navigation tools. In our inquiry, the interlocutors use different mechanisms of trust to compensate 
for the lack of institutional and religious structures that could provide more transparency in the 
ḥalāl consumption process. 
Based on intensive fieldwork conducted between March and June 2018 in Leipzig , in the context 
of two research projects – “Scharia in genuin europäischen Settings: Konnex muslimischer 
Lebenspraxis zu islamischer Normativität” of the Department ‘Law & Anthropology’ of the Max 
Planck Institute for Social Anthropology (MPI) and “Moscheegemeinden in Sachsen” of the 
Institute of Oriental Studies of the University of Leipzig (OI UL) –, this paper focuses on the ways 
practicing Muslims negotiate their ḥalāl-complaint consumption. After a brief overview of the 
historical and socio-political context surrounding Muslim lives in Leipzig, the paper elaborates the 
various mechanisms of trust used by our interlocutors to compensate for the lack of institutional 
and religious structures. By reflecting upon the particular features of Muslim religious authority 
and the legal constraints of ḥalāl slaughter in Germany, this paper provides insights into 1) the 
ways practicing Muslims negotiate their ḥalāl-compliant consumption within this context and 2) 
the challenges it poses for the consumer and the ḥalāl industry. 
 
2. The Limits of Representation  
 
The empirical data the case study is based on are situated at the micro-level in Leipzig, Germany. 
To understand the actions of actors operating in the German ḥalāl market, we outline the internal 
diversity of the Muslim part of society and how this creates issues with ensuring political 
representation of Muslims and with a lack of religious authority on the part of Muslim 
organizations. This leaves the various ḥalāl certification bodies to compete among themselves for 
market and consumer recognition in their effort to exercise religious authority. 
Over the years, political and societal actors have intensified their call for Muslim representatives. 
Likewise, a desire to represent and be represented in political processes, to play an active part in 
political and societal decisions, and to develop a strong voice in public discourse has become more 
prominent. In the case of efforts to push for a safe and comprehensive ḥalāl certification process, 
this lack of representation and the consequent inability to issue, monitor, and lobby for such 
certifications is a clear issue. Muslims in Germany are diverse with respect to their affiliations 
within the numerous currents that make up Islam, the degree to which they identify with their 
religion, and their degree of organization in, e.g., mosque communities (Stichs 2016: 26; DIK 
2012: 67; Haug et al. 2009: 97/ 167). In the face of this internal diversity, attempts to cooperate and 




Muslims in Germany have difficulties with establishing representation on a political level. The 
Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK) illustrates these challenges. Established as an ongoing event in 
2006 by the Minister for Internal Affairs, Wolfgang Schäuble, the conference is meant to serve as a 
platform for dialogue between the German state and Muslims in Germany. To this end, a varying 
group of delegates from large umbrella and national mosque organizations as well as selected 
prominent individuals are invited to participate. But the format has one intrinsic problem: only 20% 
of Muslims living in Germany were registered members of a religious association or community in 
2009 (Haug et al. 2009: 167, 170).7 In a survey commissioned by the DIK, only one-quarter of the 
respondents felt represented by the umbrella organizations present at the DIK (Bayat 2016: 124; 
Haug et al. 2009: 173–174). The inclusion of selected Muslim individuals from outside such 
organizations cannot compensate for this deficit (Bayat 2016: 298). This leaves the composition of 
the DIK and especially the umbrella and national mosque organizations with a deficit concerning 
legitimization and representation (Bayat 2016). Lobbying for interests on the inner-group level as 
well as on the political level requires leverage, which in turn is dependent on having credibility, 
which is difficult to portray if no organizational body is established. Hence, large umbrella 
organizations act as the main representatives in negotiations and conversations with political and 
societal actors despite their lack of authority to speak for Muslims in Germany as a whole.  
Furthermore, the degree of organizational structures differs within Germany due to historical 
developments after the second World War. The establishment of Muslim organizational structures 
surrounding mosque communities on a larger scale in Western Germany8 dates back to the 1960s 
(Lemmen 2002: 25; Bayat 2016: 64–67). The case study, however, is situated in Leipzig, a major 
city in Saxony, which is part of Eastern Germany.9 The number of people from Muslim-majority 
countries in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was small and migration was organized only 
from socialist states (Gruner-Domić 1999: 216). The migrants, who came either for educational 
purposes or work (as so-called Vertragsarbeiter, or “contract workers”), were relegated to living 
quarters separated from the rest of German society and their stay was intended to be short-term. 
Therefore, and because there was no possibility for migrants to formally organize due to state 
repression, no official Muslim organizational infrastructure developed (Bade and Oltmer 2004). 
After the reunification of Germany in 1990, many contract workers lost their legal status and jobs 
and left the country, as did half of the students enrolled in East German universities (Kindelberger 
and Kindelberger 2007: 7). In the 1990s and 2000s through the present, the number of Muslims 
living in Eastern Germany has increased through West-East migration within Germany, the arrival 
and settling of migrants from abroad, and conversion to Islam. The Leipzig city council estimates 
that by the end of 2017, 24,000 of the city’s ca. 590,000 residents were Muslim (Stadt Leipzig 
2019).10 In Leipzig, there are currently seven officially registered Muslim associations, one of 
which is part of an umbrella organization – DİTİB (Diyanet İşleri Türk-İslam Birliği, or the 
Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs). Thus, there is an increasing degree of consolidation 
at the organizational level, which is, however, not comparable with organizational structures in 
                                                 
7 Chbib (2011: 109) points out both the power of quantitative research and its difficulties. Instead of collecting data on 
members, she calls for collecting data on visitors and participants connected with religious organizations. 
8 The usage of the term West Germany in this paper refers to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) before the German 
reunification in 1990. The term Western Germany, however, refers to the current region of Germany that belonged to 
western portion of Germany before 1990. 
9 The usage of the term East Germany in this paper refers to the German Democratic Republic (GDR), a state established 
from 1949 to 1990, while the term Eastern Germany refers to the region of contemporary Germany that consists of the 
states of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). 
10 For further information on Muslim life in the GDR see: Hakenberg and Klemm 2016; Perabo 2018. 
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Western Germany. In this context, ḥalāl consumption for the interlocutors in this case study is 
situated in an environment that is characterized by a different availability and range of ḥalāl 
products and services than for consumers in, for example, Cologne or Berlin.  
 
3. The Three Principles of Trust  
 
When strolling down the first half of Eisenbahnstraße10F11 in Leipzig, one notices the omnipresence of 
ḥalāl. It is visible in many convenience stores in the form of stickers on windows, signs advertising 
(halal) meat and in the names of the shops themselves (i.e. “Halal Land”). It appears in Latin letters 
reading ‘halal’ (Arabic) or ‘helal’ (Turkish), or in Arabic letters – للاح. Sometimes it is visible from 
afar, written in bold big letters, and sometimes hidden among colorful depictions of animals. Ḥalāl 
is integral to the public perception of this particular street as a place where “oriental” groceries 
abound, where many snack bars and restaurants offer döner kebab, shawarma, falafel, and 
hummus. It is one of the few places in Leipzig where people are not predominantly white and 
where conversations mostly take place in languages other than German. There are two mosques in 
close proximity. Eisenbahnstraße with its well-established Muslim infrastructure is virtually unique 
in Leipzig. All but one of our interlocutors stated that they went grocery shopping on 
Eisenbahnstraße. Many go there to buy meat. Yet, for some of the interlocutors, the issue of trust 
and the lack of credibility of the ḥalāl designation of products is a reality even here.  
Theoretically, certification processes have the function of eliminating the need for the consumer 
to evaluate whether something is ḥalāl. If a product or service is certified ḥalāl, the producer can 
place a logo on the wrapping to indicate its ḥalāl nature. This process could, especially in a 
majority non-Muslim society, facilitate ḥalāl-compliant consumption. After all, the ‘ḥalālness’ of 
products is not easily verifiable (Fischer 2011: 90). In an ideal world, the consumer would trust that 
the descriptions on the wrapping, the list of ingredients, and the information on the content/quality 
of the product are accurate. However, navigating between what is religiously obligatory and what 
is religiously forbidden in a majority non-Muslim society is evidently a constant learning process; 
migrants begin this process at different ages and with a variety of priorities.  
Our interlocutors were all born outside of Germany (Hamed and Aziz in Pakistan, Rashid in 
Afghanistan, and Fatma and Tarek as well as Azme and Alaa in Egypt). All but two were 
socialized in Muslim-majority societies. For them, adapting to life in Germany included the 
renegotiation of internalized behavioral rules 11F12 about ḥalāl consumption. In their former 
environment, the ‘ḥalālness’ of products was taken as given. Living a ḥalāl-compliant life in a 
majority non-Muslim country like Germany, however, resulted in a new consciousness in the 
interlocutors. The two interlocutors who grew up mostly in Germany but were born in a Muslim-
majority country also experienced transitional changes in their consumption behavior directed at 
                                                 
11 Time and again, this street, which runs through neighborhoods described as multicultural, has been the focus of media 
attention that shapes and reinforces its negative image as hotspot for criminality and ethnic violence. Before 1990 it was a 
working-class neighborhood and it subsequently changed into a place of opportunity for migrants. However, it also 
became a place where the city officials deliberately placed migrants, creating a high density of migrants, which in turn 
contributes to certain stereotypes (Cremer 2016; Leimer 2010; Kühl 2010). Cremer (2016) spotlights various Muslim 
views regarding Eisenbahnstraße. Some avoid it as a place of segregation; others appreciate it for its plurality. Most 
consider it a place for shopping, underlining that there is no alternative. “Eisenbahnstraße is considered a necessary place 
for the Muslim community, whether for the grocery stores, the mosque, or just because it is a place where being Muslim 
is not exceptional” (Cremer 2016: 67, translation by the authors).  
12 On the idea of internalized behavioral rules as an aspect of consumption decisions (here in the case of fair trade 
products), see Andorfer and Liebe (2013). 
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living a ḥalāl-compliant life. Some of the interlocutors mentioned their reliance on ḥalāl logos 
printed on a wrapping when buying meat or other groceries, whereas others dismissed the logos as 
mere “stickers” and declared the production and certification procedures to be not transparent 
enough. In fact, despite ḥalāl being highly visible in the shops on Eisenbahnstraße, there is little 
information about the actual ‘ḥalālness’ of (meat) products. The interlocutors used different ways 
of making sure that they adhered to ḥalāl consumption. We illustrate how these trust relationships 
play out in various ḥalāl-meat purchasing mechanisms. All our interlocutors perceive themselves 
as Muslims who aim for a ḥalāl-compliant lifestyle in a majority non-Muslim society. The 
interlocutors buy ḥalāl meat based on three different purchasing strategies: 1) personal relationship 
to the butcher, 2) DIY butcher, and 3) trust in the industry. 
 
1) Personal Relationships to Islamic Butcher/Vendor 
The principle of trust, in this case, is enacted between two parties – the one who trusts and the one 
who is trusted. The relationship between them will be analyzed from the perspective of the trust-
giver – the consumer. The consumer is not sure about the ‘ḥalālness’ of the meat at the shop and 
consequently seeks assurance by asking the butcher/vendor. The latter assures the consumer that 
the meat is ḥalāl and the consumer, in turn, trusts the word of the Islamic butcher/vendor. Here, the 
butcher/vendor is recognized as a fellow Muslim and the personal relationship of the shopping 
interaction is the key component. The butcher/vendor being Muslim implies that the two parties 
share rules/religious regulation as the basis of their action. This makes the assessment of 
trustworthiness more transparent for the consumer and the bond of trust only needs to be 
established once. By providing assurances about the ‘ḥalālness’ of the meat, the butcher/vendor 
becomes subject to a sanctioning mechanism: the divine punishment in case of a deliberate lie. This 
act of taking responsibility does not require a verbal form of active confirmation; the mere fact of 
working as an Islamic butcher/vender is a moral choice, and open fraud would accordingly be a 
burden of conscience by making the butcher responsible before God. Or as our interlocutor 
Rashid13 put it: “When someone who is Muslim says ‘it is ḥalāl’, then I have to accept it per se that 
it is ḥalāl. […] I trust him with it and in doing so I don’t become guilty but my counterpart if he 
mixed in something or it [the meat] isn’t ḥalāl. Then it [the guilt] lies with him, not with me.”14  
Concerning ḥalāl consumption, Rashid talks about globalization and capitalism and the erosion 
of ḥalāl. Halal certification takes place within globalized markets, which he sees as based on 
exploitation of humans, animals, and the environment. As a result, his trust in ḥalāl as a label has 
been damaged. Ḥalāl certificates serve as important markers in majority non-Muslim societies and 
are intended to serve as a trustworthy indicator of ‘ḥalālness’. However, in the current state of 
Muslims organizations in Germany and global production conditions he wishes for more 
comprehensive and thorough certification mechanisms. On the question of how to achieve that goal 
he is pragmatic: “something has to change and that’s an individual responsibility”. Azme and Alaa, 
Fatma and Tarek also buy meat and other groceries in shops on Eisenbahnstraße but do not limit 
themselves to these personal relationships. 
 
  
                                                 
13 All names have been anonymized. 
14 The English translations of all direct and indirect quotations cited in this paper were translated by the researchers from 
German or Arabic. 
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2) DIY Butcher 
Aziz butchers animals at abattoirs in the region surrounding Leipzig. He recounts how he drives to 
the locations, chooses and buys an animal on-site, and butchers it there himself. When we asked 
about the procedure and its legal framework, he answered that the employees of the abattoirs 
record the license number of his car together with the ear tag of the animal he chooses and buys on-
site. He did not mention obtaining a special permit to perform the act of butchering himself. Rather, 
he pointed to his life-long experience of handling animals. According to him, there are several 
other people who opt for butchering animals themselves, especially around ʿĪdu l-Aḍḥā (the feast 
of sacrifice), the most important holiday in the Islamic calendar. To him, leading a ḥalāl-compliant 
life becomes particularly difficult when it comes to consuming ḥalāl meat. He has lived in 
Germany for nearly 30 years15 and has witnessed recurring problems with food safety, concerning, 
for instance, meat destined to become döner kebabs.16 This has damaged his trust in the ḥalāl meat 
sold in restaurants and food stalls and has led to him directly butchering animals in a 
slaughterhouse. 
Additionally, his ḥalāl perception has changed toward a more restrictive interpretation. He is 
convinced that only meat from non-stunned animals can be considered ḥalāl according to the 
Prophet Muḥammad. However, in Germany animals must, as a rule, be stunned before slaughter.17 
In order to consume meat from non-stunned animals, he has two options: buying imported meat or 
butchering animals himself. The latter, however, is the most laborious option in terms of 
accessibility. In theory, it entails obtaining a derogation to legally butcher an animal as a private 
person at an abattoir. To receive such a permit, individuals may have to prove their ability to 
skillfully perform the killing and attend a workshop. In Aziz’s case, the procedure seems to be 
more easily accessible due to the apparently lax handling of the issue by the employees of the 
abattoirs. However, we were not able to accompany him due to severe communication problems 
after the meeting. This leaves us with many question marks concerning the accuracy of his account. 
Assuming that his story reflects the situation at Saxonian abattoirs, we might conclude that the lax 
handling of ḥalāl slaughter opens up a free space in which the maneuvering between animal 
welfare and religious freedom can take on a different form. 
 
3) Principle of Trust in the Industry 
Alaa and Azme trust the ḥalāl certificates in supermarkets, for instance the ḥalāl certificate printed 
on products from a well-known poultry company. Ḥalāl is a holistic concept that has a twofold 
meaning to them. On the one hand, it is a flexible concept with changing meanings depending on 
the context. After moving from Egypt to Germany, they had to confront the question of whether 
meat from pre-stunned animals is considered ḥalāl or not. They changed their conception after 
evaluating animal welfare. Furthermore, whenever they are invited for meals outside their house, 
they never refuse to eat meat, unless it is pork. Ḥalāl labels influence their consumption. For both 
interlocutors, ḥalāl has two dimensions: the adherence to slaughter regulations based on the 
Qurʾān, which is indicated by the certificates, and the aspect of modest consumption. Thus, the 
choices of buying ḥalāl-certified meat at the supermarket (mostly poultry) and ḥalāl meat at, e.g., 
                                                 
15 Aziz has spent most of this period in Leipzig. But in the 1990s, at the beginning of his time in Germany, he also briefly 
lived in Western Germany.  
16 When explaining his consumption habits, he mentioned the rotten meat scandal that occurred in 2005/2006 as a turning 
point in his trust in food safety in Germany. 
17 For a more detailed study of the discourse connected with this policy, see Elliesie and Armbruster, forthcoming. 
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the shops on Eisenbahnstraße, do not contradict each other. Fatma and Tarek only buy meat that 
carries a ḥalāl logo, which to them indicates that the animal was not slaughtered in another god’s 
name. To them, it is not important where the meat is sold. Their trust is directed toward the 
certification procedures and the inner mechanisms of production monitoring, thus toward a faceless 
entity or system rather than to a physical person or place.  
For Hamed, by contrast, the ḥalāl certifications carry no meaning: “[The] ḥalāl logo is only a 
sticker.” He trusts governmental structures but not Muslim ones. Meat sold in supermarkets or in 
fast food restaurants is ḥalāl to him, if it is slaughtered according to the Qurʾān.18 Apparently, to 
him “conventional” meat meets these criteria. The most important aspect to him is that the animal 
is not slaughtered in another God’s name but the Abrahamitic/monotheistic God. He observes that 
performing the slaughter himself would be the ideal option, and he has already done so while living 
abroad. If he wants to make sure a product is ḥalāl, he trusts certificates which indicate production 
criteria that are compatible with ḥalāl rules, such as vegetarian, vegan, and kosher. 
As these examples suggest, religious authority is a central component of trust. Thus, in the 
following sections of this paper, the principles of trust will be put in perspective by first 
introducing and discussing the notion of religious authority in a Muslim context. Secondly, ḥalāl 
certification processes on the international and national level will be outlined with a focus on the 
legal constraints of ḥalāl slaughter in Germany. In a third step, negotiation processes concerning a 
ḥalāl-compliant lifestyle of the interlocutors will be retraced.  
 
4. Religious Authority and Power: Muslims in Germany 
 
In recent years, the visibility of Muslims and their religious practices in German public spaces has 
greatly increased, especially due to the influx of refugees from predominantly Muslim countries in 
the last decade. Despite their increasing numbers, Muslims still struggle to integrate their religious 
convictions into their lives, especially in Eastern Germany (Rohe 2016: 71). The social 
configurations, legal structures, and religious frameworks which Muslims experienced in their 
countries of origin differ from those in Germany. These differences in social life can pose various 
challenges for Muslims. One of these challenges would be that of living a religious life outside the 
realm of dār al-islām19 (the territory of Islam) and complying with Muslim precepts of šarīʿa20 
                                                 
18 See the Qurʾān 5:4/5: “They will ask thee as to what is lawful to them. Say: Lawful to you are all the good things of 
life. And as for those hunting animals which you train by imparting to them something of the knowledge that God has 
imparted to yourselves – eat of what they seize for you, but mention God's name over it and remain conscious of God: 
verily, God is swift in reckoning. Today, all the good things of life have been made lawful to you. And the food of those 
who have been vouchsafed revelation aforetime is lawful to you,14 and your food is lawful to them” (Translated by Asad 
1980: 181–182) 
19 Dār al-islām (territory of Islam) is a highly controversial concept: in classical Islamic law (fiqh), it is often contrasted 
with dār al-kufr or dār al-ḥarb (territory of war). This dichotomy resurfaces in current discourses, especially in 
connection with Muslim minorities living in the West. Although the term dār al-islām has been used since the first 
centuries of Islam in the context of warlike conflicts, especially in the time of the Umayyads (al-Umawiyyūn), it is not 
mentioned either in the Qurʾān or in the Sunna. Dār al-islām is defined by legal scholars (Elliesie 2014b: 347) as the 
realm where Islamic rules and regulations prevail, where a Muslim ruler has control (istīlāʾ) over the country, where 
security (al-amn) and freedom of worship (šaʿāʾir ad-dīn) are guaranteed and where justice holds sway (see Ibn al-
Qaiyim al-Ǧauzīya 1997, volume 2: 728; al-Nīšābūrī 1996, volume 3: 459; al-Baihaqī 1994, volume 9: 16; al-Māwardī 
1985; volume 1: 275; for further explanation and discussion of both concepts see: Albrecht 2018; Auda 2018; Bashir 
2018; Ramadan 2001). Nowadays, this way of dividing the world is criticized as having lost its significance. The current 
Grand Imam of al-Azhar, Aḥmad aṭ-Ṭaiyib, argues that the classification of the world into dār al-islām and dār al-ḥarb 
was a product of the armed conflicts with non-Muslims during the early time of Islam. This does not, however, apply to 
the current situation in which most Muslims live (see Aḥmad Aṭ-ṭaiyib, “Mā maʿnā dār al-Islām” episode 18 of the 
television show Al-Imām aṭ-ṭaiyib, streamed live on 23 June 2016. YouTube video, 3:09. https://bit.ly/35fEKvT 
[accessed 02.01.2020]).  
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within a predominantly non-Muslim society. In other words, while the fixed and institutionally 
framed religious structures in Muslim countries can offer a clear point of reference and regulatory 
framework for everyday life, practicing Muslims in Germany have to find new ways to follow 
Islamic precepts.21  
At the same time, the German state has no official religion and the basic principle which 
constitutes the relationship between state and religious communities is the “neutrality of the 
state”.22 This means that the state is not allowed to interfere in religious affairs or define what 
constitutes a religion or a religious behavior.23 Religious communities have to “regulate and 
administer their affairs independently within the limits of the law.”24 Accordingly, the German 
state cannot establish state-regulated religious authorities25 that control religious life and adjudicate 
religious matters for particular religions or denominations. In order to comply with šarīʿa in their 
new communities, practicing Muslims in Germany – and in Europe more broadly – have to 
negotiate non-Muslim-based social structures and normative orders and find solutions to the unique 
challenges and problems they face in various daily life practices (Bunt 2003: 125–133). The 
religious life of Muslims in Germany is, despite endeavors to introduce more formal institutional 
structures, shaped mostly by two main factors: the absence of organizational structure and 
centralized religious authority and the large amount of free space for individuality. This applies 
particularly to those who originate from Muslim-majority countries where religious institutions are 
blended with state institutions and the law is to a certain extent adapted to Islamic rulings.  
When it comes to the finest activity of everyday life, e.g. eating and drinking, practicing Muslims 
in Germany are expected to be aware of what kinds of food and drink are permissible according to 
Islamic rules.26 Since Islamic religious authority is not institutionalized in Germany, differing 
interpretations of religious texts are not binding or circumscribed – as would be the case in 
Muslim-majority countries, or for followers of other religions such as the Catholic Church. Rather, 
interpretations vary depending on the social, political, and even individual contexts in which they 
are embedded. The fact that the Qurʾān and Sunna are open for a wide range of interpretations (see 
                                                                                                                                                    
20 Šarīʿa (Arab.; pl. šarāʾiʿ) is a contested term that currently has negative connotations, especially in media and public 
discourses in the West. Šarīʿa literally means “the path to the waterhole” (mawrid aṭ-ṭarīq al-laḏī yūṣil ilā al-māʾ, see: 
Qurʾān 45: 18). It is the imagined totality of the normative system of Islam, the message given by God to Muh ̣ạmmad. It 
includes legal and ethical moral rules and statements of faith. According to Islamic legal theory, the Qurʾān, Sunna, qiyās 
(analogical reasoning), and ijmāʿ (juridical consensus) are the sources of šarīʿa (see Krawietz 2011). Other scholars refer 
to šarīʿa as a product of the human endeavor to understand the divine will (see Abū Zaid 1996: 16; An-Naʿim 2008: 12–
15; Hefny 2010: 77–80).  
21 For example: in majority Muslim contexts working times during Ramadan are usually adapted to the fasting time; the 
meat in any Egyptian butcher’s shop is supposed to be ḥalāl. No such adaptations of social structures are likely to be 
present in non-Muslim majority contexts. 
22 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (GG), Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 1949 No. 1, issued on 23 May 
1949, pp. 1ff. See Art. 137 (1) GG in conjunction with Art. 137 (1) WRV. This paper uses the English translation 
prepared by Christian Tomuschat, David P. Currie, Donald P. Kommers, and Raymond Kerr, in cooperation with the 
Language Service of the German Bundestag, 2019. 
23 In this context, the main objective of the German state is to protect the freedom of religious life. The German state can, 
however, cooperate with religious communities and help them to establish religious life under the protection of German 
law. For a detailed overview about the possible forms of cooperation between the German state and religious 
communities, see Korioth and Augsberg 2010: 321–325.  
24 See Art. 140 GG in conjunction with Art. 140 WRV. 
25 In many Muslim-majority countries, there are institutions in charge of religious matters, although the role of such 
institutions has declined in recent years. These include, for instance, Al-Azhar in Egypt, the Standing Committee for 
Legal Issues in Saudi Arabia (al-Laǧna ad-Dāʾima li-l-Buḥūṯ al-ʿIlmīya wa-l-Iftāʾ), and the office of Supreme Religious 
Leader in Iran (Persian ربهر, rahbar), which was established according to the Iranian constitution of 1979. 
26 On drinking see Salim 2018 and on eating cf. Elliesie and Armbruster, forthcoming. 
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Elliesie 2014a: 5f.) highlights the issue of religious authorities27 (see Krämer and Schmidtke 2006: 
1–2). In this context, a number of questions arise: Who speaks for Muslims? Who speaks on behalf 
of God? Who is entitled to interpret religious texts and transmit religious knowledge? What is the 
role of contemporary and former Muslim scholars (ʿālim, plural ʿulamāʾ) and of religious 
institutions and figures in Islamic countries regarding religious matters for Muslims living outside 
the territory of Islam? To what extent can imams, religious communities, and individuals exert 
religious authority? Where exactly do the sources of religious authority in Islam lie? (ibid). It is not 
the purpose of this paper to provide answers to these questions. However, asking these questions 
helps us understand and delineate the practices related to ḥalāl among our interlocutors. An 
analytical starting point for this exploration will be the notion of authority and the attempt to 
connect it to Muslim practices and thoughts. 
 
Authority(ies) in Islam 
The word authority derives from the Latin word auctōritās which means “invention, advice, 
opinion, influence, power, command”.28 It signifies “the power or right to give orders, make 
decisions, and enforce obedience”.29 The idea of religious authority usually refers to clergy30 in the 
Christian sense. This does not, however, apply for religious authority in Islam. There is no specific 
figure nor any centralized authority in Islam31 that unequivocally speaks for Muslims the way the 
clergy do in the Christian context. In Islam there is a rule that states, “lā wasāṭata baina al-ʿabdi 
wa-rabbihi”, meaning that Islam does not envisage intermediaries between God and the believers 
(Abū Zahra 1969: 67). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the concept of authority does not exist 
at all in Islam (Mandaville 2007: 305). Islamic religious authority has multiple forms and numerous 
sources within certain political, social, cultural, and religious contexts. Throughout history, a 
number of religious leaders and figures have been considered authoritative voices of Islam. Today, 
the quest for and implications of religious authority are crucial in Europe, both for Muslim 
believers and for political leaders who seek to identify an official representative body for Muslim 
communities (Schneiders and Kaddor 2005: 16). 
Authority, as indicated by Krämer and Schmidtke, is an elusive concept and a very hard one to 
define and narrow down, especially in the Islamic context (Krämer and Schmidtke 2006: 1). Max 
Weber defines authority as “die Chance für einen Befehl bestimmten Inhalts bei angebbaren 
Personen Gehorsam zu finden” (Weber 1980: 28), or the likelihood that a command within a given 
context will be obeyed by a given group without recourse to coercive power. Legitimacy 
(Legitimität) and the absence of coercive power are for Weber the key elements which distinguish 
                                                 
27 Abou El Fadl argues that there is no centralized authority in Islam other than God and the Prophet which is reflected by 
texts, e.g. the Qurʾān and Sunna (Abou El Fadl 2003: 11). This raises the question of who is authorized to transmit the 
essence of religious knowledge to Muslim believers. 
28 See the entry for “authority” from the Online Etymology Dictionary (https://www.etymonline.com/word/authority 
#etymonline_v_18966 [accessed 02.01.2020]).  
29 See the entry for “authority” from Oxford Dictionaries (https://bit.ly/2MN9uxS [accessed 02.01.2020]). 
30 As indicated by Carroll, “clergy are typically granted authority in their ordination to proclaim the Word of God, 
administer the sacraments, and order the life of the congregation” (Carroll 1981: 99).  
31 Shia Islam is a major exception and represents one of the main two trends in Islam. Most of the Shia believe in the 
theology of Twelver. The term Twelver refers to adherents of the twelve divinely ordained Imams (starting with Alī b. 
Abī Ṭālib and ending with Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Mahdī). Twelver Shia Muslims believe that the Twelver Imams 
and their followers can through the means of iǧtihād (independent reasoning) interpret the Qurʾān and adjudicate 
religious matters. Accordingly, the Twelver Shia, in contrast to Sunni, have acknowledged authoritative bodies to speak 
for them. In modern times, Shia Islam has undergone fundamental changes in its authoritative structure, especially after 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the implementation of Vilayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist; 
Persian: تيلاو هيقف ) (Amirpul 2006: 218–240).  
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authority (Autorität) from power (Macht) (Krämer and Schmidtke 2006: 1–2.). With specific 
reference to religious authority, Krämer and Schmidtke suggest an interesting additional 
dimension: “In the monotheistic religions founded on revealed scripture, religious authority further 
involves the ability (chance, power, or right) to compose and define the canon of ‘authoritative’ 
texts and the legitimate methods of interpretation” (ibid.). 
In line with Sarah Albrecht, in this study we understand religious authority not as being based on 
sovereignty or coercive power, but rather in the Bourdieuian sense of a symbolic power based 
mainly on acceptance (Albrecht 2018: 32; 294), “a power of constituting the given through 
utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the world 
[…] a power that can be exercised only if it is recognized” (Bourdieu 1991: 170). Building upon 
this definition, religious authority is relational and contingent because it is based on recognition, 
persuasion, and trust (Krämer and Schmidtke 2006: 1–2; Albrecht 2018: 394; Zaman 2012: 32). 
Furthermore, Zaman emphasizes that religious authority should be understood within the given 
social, political, and historical context in which it is produced and perceived (Zaman 2012: 32).  
In addition, religious authority is a matter of contestation and debate by both the authoritative 
bodies and the followers of a religion (Zaman 2012: 33; Albrecht 2018: 394). Contestation of 
religious authority in Islam is not a modern phenomenon; rather it has been a matter of controversy 
and armed conflicts ever since Islam’s inception. During his lifetime, the Prophet Muḥammad was 
considered the single charismatic authority32 in the Weberian sense, hence entitled to transmit 
divine revelation. After his death, however, early Muslims were confronted for the first time with 
questions of legitimacy and authority (Zaman 2009: 207). Khaled Abou El Fadl argues that the 
rebellions and the conflicts during the period of the first four caliphs reveal this crisis or lack of an 
uncontested authority (Abou El Fadl 2003: 12).33 In modern times, the concept of religious 
authority has gained unprecedented salience and it is currently a matter of considerable contestation 
among Muslim believers, Islamic legal scholars, intellectuals, and activists.34 Heated debates 
among Muslim scholars in the last two centuries have led to what Olivier Roy has called “the crisis 
of religious authority and religious knowledge” (Roy 2004: 158ff.)35 and Francis Robinson a 
                                                 
32 For Max Weber charisma “soll eine als außeralltäglich (ursprünglich, sowohl bei Propheten wie bei therapeutischen 
wie bei Rechts-Weisen wie bei Jagdführern wie bei Kriegshelden: als magisch bedingt) geltende Qualität einer 
Persönlichkeit heißen, um derentwillen sie als mit übernatürlichen oder übermenschlichen oder mindestens spezifisch 
außeralltäglichen, nicht jedem andern zugänglichen Kräften oder Eigenschaften [begabt] oder als gottgesandt oder als 
vorbildlich und deshalb als ‘Führer’ gewertet wird. Wie die betreffende Qualität von irgendeinem ethischen, ästhetischen 
oder sonstigen Standpunkt aus ‘objektiv’ richtig zu bewerten sein würde, ist natürlich dabei begrifflich völlig 
gleichgültig: darauf allein, wie sie tatsächlich von den charismatisch Beherrschten, den ‘Anhängern’, bewertet wird, 
kommt es an” (Weber 1980: 140). In short, charisma refers to a characteristic of an individual who possess certain 
extraordinary character traits that make him or her a leader.  
33 These conflicts include, for instance, the civil war, known as the Wars of Apostasy (ḥurūb ar-ridda ), during the time of 
the first caliph Abū Bakr (632–634) and the assassinations of the second caliph ʿUmar b. al-Ḫaṭṭāb (634–644), the third 
caliph ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān (644–656), and the fourth caliph ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (656–661). 
34 In her insightful study on the concept of dār al-islām and dār al-ḥarb, Albrecht illustrates current controversies among 
Islamic legal scholars regarding the question of who is authorized to issue legal opinions, where, and for whom. Some of 
these controversies were sparked, for instance, by the Egyptian scholar Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn Sulṭān, a member of the European 
Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), and the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA), when they urged the Grand 
Muftī of Egypt, ʿAlī Ǧumʿa, to coordinate and consult with the boards of fatwa and research in majority non-Muslim 
countries (Albrecht 2018: 391ff.). 
35 Olivier Roy draws a connection between the crisis of religious authority and the declining role of religious teaching 
institutions. Since the eleventh century the body of learned ʿulamāʾ within the madrasa system had de facto hegemony on 
religious discourses. However, this body of ʿulamāʾ has been in crisis since the nineteenth century. Political authorities 
are gradually taking control over traditional madrasas (for instance, following legislation in 1961, the Egyptian president 
now appoints the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar in Cairo). Traditional madrasas have also been bypassed by the establishment 
of modern alternative religious institutions and private madrasas. Multiple actors within and outside the traditional 
madrasa system share the hegemony over the production of religious knowledge (Roy 2004: 158–164). 
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“fragmentation of religious authority” (Robinson 2009: 339). This has been triggered by a series of 
global processes: the globalization of knowledge, modernization, the proliferation of mass media, 
the rise of information and communication technologies, the increasing access to education, and the 
increasing rate of literacy (Mandaville 2007: 306; Robinson 2009: 339; Roy 2004: 160; Salvatore 
2012: 200; Sunier 2018: 61). 
Francis Robinson emphasizes the role played by print media in the mid-twentieth century in 
undermining and fragmenting the authority of ʿulamāʾ (Robinson 1993: 234). By turning to printed 
media, the ʿulamāʾ shook the very pillars of Islamic production of knowledge, which based its 
trustworthiness, value, and authority on oral transmission (ibid.). While print and other modern 
media have given ʿulamāʾ new chances to disseminate their religious knowledge to a broader 
audience and consequently reaffirm their authority on a global scale; these media have also given 
voice to emergent new actors who claim their own religious authority in competition with the 
traditional ʿulamāʾ (see Albrecht 2018: 394; Mandaville 2007: 309; Robinson 2009: 353). New 
media and communication technologies have opened up a large free space for Muslims all over the 
world to access a variety of interpretations of religious primary sources and divergent religious 
knowledge (see Bunt 2018: 63–98). As a result, the production of religious knowledge no longer 
lies within the authority of traditional ʿulamāʾ and the holders of iǧāza (see Bunt 2003: 205–211).36 
As Robinson describes, every Muslim now has the chance to access and engage with religious texts 
and select from a wide variety of sources, interpretations, and visions of Islam in diverse social, 
political, and geographical contexts (Robinson 1993: 245).  
Furthermore, both professionals and semiprofessionals – intellectuals, religious populists, and 
activists – are increasingly involved in the production of religious knowledge with no recognizable 
hierarchy. Additionally, since Muslims are nowadays exposed to a wide variety of new ideas, 
world views, and new conceptions of religion (Mandaville 2007: 306), the field of Muslim 
authority is undergoing a gradual ‘democratization’ process. In fact, believers can now also employ 
social media to critically engage with religious scholars, intellectuals, and activists and even 
evaluate their thoughts. Peter emphasizes that the role and influence of traditional Imams, 
especially in the context of non-Muslim majority societies, has declined to a certain extent (Peter 
2006).  
Given this multitude of competing religious authorities, in the following section we look at the 
ways our interlocutors negotiate with religious authorities on the individual level in their daily life 
practices. In addition, we focus on how the negotiation processes of the interlocutors are influenced 
by social and legal structures and individual frameworks. 
 
Interpretative Authority: Ethnographic Field Notes  
The shift in Islamic authority was also corroborated by some of our interlocutors, who strongly 
disagreed with the version of Islam represented by their local imam. During a household interview, 
Alaa and Azme, for instance, expressed their critical views toward the religious discourse taking 
place in the Al-Rahman Mosque in Leipzig. Alaa emphasized: “My understanding of Islam is 
totally different than the one of the imam. As an Azharī [graduate of Al-Azhar University], I have 
another version of Islam”. He added that he is not positively impressed by any imam in the state of 
                                                 
36 Iǧāza is an Arabic word which literally means ‘authorization, license’. It implies that “an authorized guarantor of a text 
or of a whole book (his own work or a work received through a chain of transmitters going back to the first transmitter or 
to the author) gives a person the authorization to transmit it in his turn, so that the person authorized can avail himself of 
this transmission” (Vajda, Goldziher, and Bonebakker 2012). 
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Saxony. His educational background serves as the main source of his understanding of Islam: “I am 
an Islamic scholar or rather an Islamic theologian, which means that I have studied enough and 
learned about Islam, so that I am able to represent my version of Islam and transmit it to other 
Muslims”.  
Both of the interlocutors further indicated that the local imam exercises authority over the 
Muslim community in Saxony. However, they do not think that a hierarchical structure of authority 
over Muslims is stipulated by Islam. They are critical of the degree of attention and value awarded 
to the local imam by both local Muslims and the German community. Alaa expressed the view that 
the imam in general has only a limited role and, hence, Muslims should not turn to him with every 
issue and question they have. Azme declared that the lack of alternative Arabic mosque 
communities is the only reason why they go to the Al-Rahman Mosque. The fact that the Al-
Rahman Mosque is at present the only religious space for Arabic-speaking Muslims in Leipzig 
serves to some extent as a source of authority given to the imam as a leader of the mosque 
community. In addition to conducting shared prayers, the mosque offers various activities such as 
Arabic and religious lessons, Muslim funerals, and counseling for families.37 These services can 
further increase the authority of the imam. Muslims living in Leipzig, especially Arabic-speaking 
ones, seem to navigate religious life by (1) accessing religious knowledge themselves and finding 
their own ways through a wide variety of sources and interpretations of Islam or (2) relying on 
religious authority represented by the local imam.  
In another household interview, Tarek and Fatma also criticized the role of the imam, both in 
Germany and in their country of origin. Fatma pointed out that “in both Egypt and in Germany, 
imams are only concerned about having control over Muslims and making them obedient, like herd 
animals”. Tarek does not agree with some of the fatāwā (Islamic legal opinions) issued by the local 
imam of the Al-Rahman Mosque: “Muslim men are not allowed to shake hands with women and 
Muslims are not allowed to congratulate Christians on their religious festivities, like Christmas”. 
Tarek argues: “This is his own opinion; I do not follow it since I do not think that it is ḥarām 
[forbidden]”. Tarek emphasizes that most people who ask the imam to issue a fatwa do not have 
any specific religious education. Tarek’s and Fatma’s educational background – study at Al-Azhar 
University and contact with other educated people in their families – serves as source for acquiring 
autonomous religious knowledge. Like Alaa and Azme, they both highlight the lack of other, more 
moderate Arabic mosques: “We need a moderate alternative that does not incite against others and 
only preaches about what God and the Prophet say; and does not talk about unbelievers or 
Germans”.  
By contrast, for Rashid (who is a representative for his mosque), it is the mosque community that 
serves as a source of religious knowledge. He further relies on his parents and the vast sources of 
religious knowledge available on the internet, or in his words “šaiḫ Google”. In particular, he 
mentioned the videos and posts published in English by the US preacher Nouman Ali Khan.  
In our interview with the imam of the Ahmadiyya community in Leipzig, he defines his role as 
an imam in two respects, internally and externally. Internally, he is responsible for the religious 
education and spiritual training of the community members. He serves as a role model and a person 
of trust. Externally, he considers himself entitled to raise awareness, disseminate and transmit 
knowledge about Islam and to be available as a contact person for politics.  
                                                 
37 See the page “Aktivitäten” (activities) on the website of the Al-Rahman Mosque: https://bit.ly/39rj5El [02.01.2020]. 
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During the participant observation we conducted in Leipzig, Nasrat talked about his 
understanding of Islam and his position in relation to the Muslim authorities. In his view, there is 
only one right version of Islam that Muslims should follow. He based his position on the saying of 
the Prophet transmitted by ʿAbdallāh ibn ʿUmar: ‘Verily it will happen to my people even as it did 
to the Children of Israel. The Children of Israel were divided into seventy-two sects, and my people 
will be divided into seventy-three. Every one of these sects will go to Hell, except one sect.’ The 
Companions said, ‘O Prophet, which is that?’ He said, ‘The religion which is professed by me and 
my Companions’.” Nasrat was critical of the role of religious authorities such as imams and 
mullahs (Persian: mollā37F38), as they try to mediate between God and the people and claim to know 
the authentic word of God.  
These examples highlight how religious authority is negotiated by Muslims and the role played 
by education and modern technologies in fragmenting the traditional authority of the ʿulamāʾ and 
in offering Muslims alternative sources for the acquisition of religious knowledge and 
interpretation of the religious texts. Robinson illustrates the way that “[…] religious authority, in 
the helpful image of the French political scientist, Olivier Roy, has become a ‘bricolage’, a do-it-
yourself-project” (Robinson 2009: 353). Thus, he points out, “every individual’s view comes to 
have the same value as everyone else’s. Arguably, the Muslim world has returned to the 
interpretative anarchy which marked its early years” (ibid). 
Ultimately, the prerogative of interpretation and the monopoly on the transmission of religious 
knowledge have broken down. Mandaville suggests that the competition between authoritative 
bodies may encourage believers to find and embrace an interpretation of Islam that is better suited 
to their personal circumstances and inclinations (Mandaville 2007: 304–305).38F39 This is also 
reflected in our findings, as religious authority is negotiated by our interlocutors on the individual 
level. The production of religious knowledge no longer lies in the hands of traditional authorities 
such as ʿulamā and imams. Islamic authority is fragmented and there is no power that can control 
religious affairs or enforce religious rulings. Individuals access religious knowledge themselves. 
Our interlocutors find their own way based on the available sources and versions of Islam. This is 
evident in discourses related to ḥalāl, as will be explored in the following section. 
 
Religious Authorities in the Case of Ḥalāl  
As illustrated, religious authority among Muslims has become more complicated in the last two 
centuries. In Muslim-majority countries, religious institutions, which are mostly controlled by state 
authorities, play a decisive role in religious affairs. In majority non-Muslim countries (in our case 
Germany), the state does not intervene in religious matters. According to the German constitution 
(Grundgesetz), “[r]eligious societies shall regulate and administer their affairs independently within 
the limits of the law that applies to all. They shall confer their offices without the participation of 
the state or the civil community”. 39F40 Muslims in Germany represent a heterogeneous group with 
regard to their educational and ethnic or cultural backgrounds, their levels of religiosity, their 
                                                 
38 The word ‘mullah’ drives from Arabic mawlā which means ‘lord’ or ‘master’. It is “a title of function (ʿuhda), of 
dignity or profession (manṣab) and of rank (martaba)” (Calmard 2012). The term is used in some parts of the Muslim 
world, e.g. Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, to refer to religious leaders. 
39 In majority non-Muslim societies, the clash, or rather the encounter, between Muslims and non-Muslims with different 
backgrounds, origins, and religious and political persuasions may produce a pluralistic understanding of Islam and 
different versions of Islamic ways of life than those that dominate in Muslim-majority societies. 
40 “Jede Religionsgesellschaft ordnet und verwaltet ihre Angelegenheiten selbständig innerhalb der Schranken des für alle 
geltenden Gesetzes. Sie verleiht ihre Ämter ohne Mitwirkung des Staates oder der bürgerlichen Gemeinde”: Art. 140 GG 
in conjunction with Art. 140 WRV. 
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political affiliations, and their diverse experiences. Thus, it seems impossible to have one 
representative body that adjudicates religious matters and speaks for all Muslims living in 
Germany. The lack of institutionalized religious authority for Muslims in Germany allows multiple 
actors and private organizations to compete to attain religious legitimacy (Roy 2004; Mandaville 
2007; Robinson 2009). This has also given individuals a considerable space to navigate through the 
various competing sources and forms of religious authorities inside and outside Germany and 
choose their own paths (Robinson 1993: 245; Bunt 2009: 7–54). Regarding the case of ḥalāl, our 
interlocutors indeed navigate through the available sources and have developed their own ḥalāl 
concept; nevertheless, they are pressured to negotiate it in accordance with the dominant social, 
economic, legal, and religious structures. 
The issue of ḥalāl and the ḥalāl industry provides an example of the lack of a centralized 
religious institution. In Germany, the ḥalāl market incorporates a wide variety of actors who claim 
authority over ḥalāl and ‘ḥalālness’: Islamic scholars, imams, food scientists,41 veterinarians, 
certifiers, entrepreneurs, butchers, salespersons, ordinary believers. They all share a sort of 
pluralistic religious authority and impact the ḥalāl consumption of the Muslim communities in 
Germany. As a result of the proliferation of authority over the ḥalāl market, a multiplicity of ḥalāl 
certifications and standards has arisen. Bergeaud-Blackler indicates that the crucial reason behind 
the variations of the ḥalāl standards lies not in the different rulings of the Islamic legal schools, but 
rather in the “logical marketing differentiation on both economic and religious markets” 
(Bergeaud-Blackler 2016a: 123). There is no mechanism established by secular law to set the rules 
and standards for the ḥalāl market because of its religious nature. The concept of defined religious 
authorities that have control over the ḥalāl industry and decide on the ‘ḥalālness’ of products does 
not exist in German law. This has led to an increasing competition between all actors involved in 
the ḥalāl industry, whereby every certifier wants to appear ‘more ḥalāl’ than its competitors (ibid. 
105). Some ḥalāl certification bodies in Germany try to compensate for the lack of religious 
legitimacy by, for example, recruiting Islamic scholars and highlighting their educational 
background in Islamic studies or the involvement of their board members in mosque communities. 
Additionally, most of the certifiers highlight the recognition they have gained from international 
ḥalāl authorities and certification bodies in Muslim-majority countries. By so doing, the ḥalāl 
certifiers hope to gain trust, credibility, and greater public acceptance of their products among 
Muslim consumers in Germany. At present, there is no collective body of certifiers or Islamic 
scholars who strive for a single ḥalāl standard for Muslims in Germany. The globalization of 
knowledge, modernization, the rise of information and communication technologies, and the 
increasing debates on social media regarding religious matters have led to new modes and forms of 
dealing with the question of religious authorities.  
On the consumer level, there is a widespread lack of awareness of the diverse ḥalāl certifications 
and their manifold standards. The ḥalāl certification processes and the monitoring methods used by 
firms and ḥalāl certification bodies are often not transparent for the individual consumer (see 
Bergeaud-Blackler 2016a). The principle of trust (see section 3) seems to be the most important 
aspect when purchasing ḥalāl products and it can to some extent outweigh the legitimacy of the 
ḥalāl certificate. Consequently, the religious affiliation of the butcher or the salesperson plays a 
decisive role in the purchase of ḥalāl products. The religious affiliation gives the butcher or the 
                                                 
41 Bergeaud-Blackler notes the role of food scientists (rather than religious scholars) in the creation of guidelines for the 
industrial production of ḥalāl food (2016b: 92–93). 
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salesperson recognition, which in turn influences a consumer’s decision on whether a certain 
product is allowed for Muslims. In this context the religious identity of the butcher and salesperson 
serves as a source of religious legitimacy for Muslims. The analysis of our interlocutors’ 
purchasing strategies shows that the creation of credibility as to what ḥalāl is occurs on the 
individual level. It is shaped by the lack of authority on certain levels, which means that 
negotiation processes are fueled by other influences, such as social and economic configurations, 
legal structures, and religious frameworks. 
 
Ḥalāl Certification Bodies (HCBs): The Struggle for Authority 
In 2014, there were an estimated 400 ḥalāl certification bodies (HCBs) worldwide – most of them 
without accreditation by or registration with an international organization (HalalFocus 2014). The 
demand for halal certified products is expected to grow in parallel with “the increase in the Muslim 
population all over the world.” (Abd Latiff et al. 2014: 87). Following this market trend, ḥalāl 
certification bodies began to proliferate, as Abd Latiff et al. note, without “rules and regulations 
pertaining to the establishment of ḥalāl certification bodies”; therefore, “the discretion of whether 
or not to accept products certified by these bodies was set to the consumers and the consuming 
countries” (ibid: 90). In other words, it was/is left to individual consumers and the state to work out 
guiding principles as to what ḥalāl means in an economic setting. In some countries, this 
unorganized situation was soon regulated and institutionalized by state and/or market actors, who 
strive to gain international accreditation and recognition for their standards. Moreover, starting 
from the mid-2000s, some states and organizations have attempted to standardize ḥalāl 
internationally. In this context, Bergeaud-Blackler (2016c) argues that  
 
“[e]ach initiative has adopted a pragmatic approach in line with their own requirements and 
each attempt to impose their views on their trade partners. Malaysia opts for the expertise, the 
US, to build a network of mutual recognition, the Gulf countries are competing to be the 
worldwide religious reference point, Turkey plays the community card and attempts to take 
OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) leadership to Malaysia, and the Europeans are 
trying to impose their standard by erecting legal barriers.” (196)  
 
Malaysia has hitherto managed to be the most successful country in establishing a comprehensive 
ḥalāl standard, which is developed and monitored by the state agency JAKIM, the Department of 
Islamic Development Malaysia, and has gained international recognition (Abd Latiff et al. 2014; 
Badruldin et al. 2012).  
In Germany, however, there are no such established standards. As in other countries, uneven 
certification practices and a lack of transparency leave Muslim consumers to find their own way 
(Nakyinsige et al. 2012: 213). This situation of disorientation for consumers is noted in the work of 
the EC-funded research project DIALREL. They point to the problem of “self-appointed 
certification bodies” and address authenticity of ḥalāl certificates and the lack of auditing standards 
as being among the issues that need to be solved in the future in order to ensure a trustworthy and 
efficient ḥalāl standard in the EU (Anil et al. 2010: 14–15). In the context of ḥalāl standards 
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competing in the international arena, it should be noted that the establishment of a widely 
recognized, state-created and controlled definition of ḥalāl constitutes a form of soft power.42 
In Germany, there are nine43 ḥalāl certification bodies that certify products and services 
according to their own specific ḥalāl standards. These standards vary, e.g. concerning the question 
of whether pre-stunned slaughtered animals can still be considered ḥalāl or not.44 On the national 
and international level, ḥalāl certification bodies have joined forces to work out ḥalāl certificates 
that aim at ensuring the quality and adherence to religious norms that the respective standards are 
meant to operationalize. In Germany, five ḥalāl certification bodies have joined efforts and 
founded the Gütegemeinschaft Halal-Lebensmittel (quality assurance association for ḥalāl food 
products) under the umbrella of RAL German Institute for Quality Assurance and Certification, an 
independent organization that issues quality marks for products of all types. Some ḥalāl 
certification bodies are part of international networks such as the World Halal Council, the 
International Halal Integrity Association, and the Halal Research Council. The nine Germany-
based ḥalāl certification bodies act as competitive market participants which are interested in 
creating a demand for their service. No institutional body in Germany holds enough religious 
authority to generate a comprehensive ḥalāl standard that could be regulated and monitored by this 
institution and could counteract consumer disorientation and misuse of the ḥalāl designation.  
Ḥalāl production is also subject to state regulations and legal obligations. The ḥalāl meat market 
in Germany for example, is conditioned by EU and national legislation. EU legislation sets the 
overall framework. On the one hand, the European Union’s Council Regulation 1099/200945 
directs that all animals be stunned before slaughter. On the other hand, derogations can be allowed 
by the member states of the EU based on the principle of freedom of religion.46 As a result, both 
pre-stunned and non-stunned slaughter are possible slaughter methods in the EU. However, to date 
implementation among EU member countries has not been consistent, since the respective national 
slaughter regulations fall under the sovereignty of the member states.47 In the case of German 
legislation, the pre-stunning method is the norm. All animals, whether within the context of ḥalāl 
slaughter or not, must be stunned before killing. German legislation (the Tierschutzgesetz 
[TierSchG], or Animal Welfare Act)48 grants exceptions to members of a religious community in 
which mandatory religious prescripts prohibit the consumption of meat from pre-stunned animals. 
                                                 
42 In this context, the developments and efforts by the Malaysian government concerning the Malaysian standard 
MS1500 is a good example. Many certifiers around the world already recognize the MS1500, including the FAO and 
WHO, which mention it in their Codex Alimentarius. 
43 There are no reliable sources concerning the quantity and quality of the ḥalāl certification bodies in Germany. The 
information about ḥalāl certification bodies in Germany derives from our own research. Please note that the list may be 
incomplete or information outdated: 1) Halal Control (https://www.halalcontrol.de), 2) EHZ (Europäisches Halal 
Zertifizierungsinstitut; https://www.eurohalal.eu), 3) IZM (Islamisches Zentrum München), 4) m-haditec 
(http://www.halal-zertifikat.de), 5) Halal Europe (https://halaleurope.de/willkommen.html), 6) ECT Halal World 
(https://www.halalworld-germany.de), 7) IZH (Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg), 8) WHU (World Halal Union, 
http://www.halal-zertifizierung.de/#about), 9) HCG (Halal Certificate Germany, http://www.halal-certification.de) 
[access date for all websites: 02.01.2020]. 
44 For example, Halal Control does not consider industrially slaughtered meat to be ḥalāl and hence does not certify meat 
in Germany (see the page “Gründsätze” (principles) on the Halal Control website: https://www.halalcontrol.de/4-2/ 
[accessed 19.02.2020]). 
45 Official Journal of the European Union, L 303/1 (18 November 2009): 1–30. 
46 On Germany’s policy, see Elliesie and Armbruster, forthcoming. 
47 For a detailed overview of the implementation of pre-stunning and non-stunning in individual European states, see the 
section “Germany” in the report “Legal Restrictions on Religious Slaughter in Europe” from the Law Library of 
Congress, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/religious-slaughter/europe.php#germany (last updated September 2019, 
accessed 19.02.2020). 
48 Tierschutzgesetz, Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2018 Teil I Nr. 47, Bonn, issued on 20 December 2018, pp. 2586ff. 
(latest revised version). 
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In this case, a derogation must be requested from the responsible authority at the federal level and, 
if granted, does not apply to commercial slaughter (TierSchG §4 a, para 2, no. 2). As the German 
case illustrates, the legal framework can limit consumption options for individuals who have 
certain definitions as to what renders meat ḥalāl. In Germany, Muslim consumers have the option 
to choose between imported meat of non-stunned animals, which may not satisfy the requirement 
of freshness, or meat of pre-stunned animals slaughtered in Germany. Meat from non-stunned 
animals slaughtered in Germany is an exception due to the legal restriction that requires filing for a 
derogation and prohibits commercial non-stunned slaughter.  
From a global point of view, Germany and other European countries do not have the institutional 
framework to monitor ḥalāl meat production. Abd Latiff et al. describe ḥalāl certification as a 
“quality control system” that (ideally) encompasses all aspects of production (2014: 86). These 
aspects of ḥalāl products might hold true for consumers in countries with a majority Muslim 
population and goods produced in the EU for export (Regenstein et al. 2003). With regards to the 
actual quality of ḥalāl products certified in the EU, the situation does not look promising. In a 
comparative analysis of global ḥalāl standards, HMC, which was chosen for the study as a 
representative European certifier, ranked last, fulfilling only 27% of the requirements Abd Latiff et 
al. (2014: 95) tested. Consequently, even in France and the UK, the two European countries with 
the largest market for ḥalāl products and the most sophisticated ḥalāl certification process in EU 
comparison, consumer trust in ḥalāl meat products is low (Lever and Miele 2012: 530–532). 
 
5. Negotiating Ḥalāl Consumption 
 
Following up on the discussion of the struggles for religious authority, the denial of recognition of 
religious authorities by parts of Muslim communities, and the resulting individual negotiation 
processes regarding ḥalāl consumption, a second structural layer of limitations becomes apparent. 
The national slaughter regulations and EU-level religious freedom principles determine what kind 
of meat is readily available on the ḥalāl market in Germany. Nevertheless, ḥalāl certifications do 
not always serve their assigned purpose of offering orientation and encouraging the consumer to 
trust their standards. Our interlocutors purchase ḥalāl meat using three different mechanisms: 1) 
personal relationship to the butcher, 2) DIY butchering, and 3) trust in the industry. 
These mechanisms ensure that their purchase is in line with their understanding of ḥalāl and can 
be arranged along a ḥalāl continuum. It spans from ‘easy’ to ‘laborious’ according to the 
accessibility of ḥalāl meat; individuals’ placement along this continuum is determined by their 
ḥalāl concept.49 Starting with easily accessible, Hamed has the least constraints on his purchasing 
options. He considers ḥalāl all meat that is not slaughtered in another God’s name and does not 
look for ḥalāl certificates. Fatma and Tarek, and Alaa and Azme, look for ḥalāl certificates when 
purchasing meat. Since ḥalāl-certified meat can only seldom be found in mainstream supermarkets, 
they rely on Islamic butchers, and hence they are placed further in the direction ‘less easy/more 
laborious’ on the continuum. Rashid does not trust ḥalāl certificates and his own verification 
mechanism relies on a personal relationship with the Islamic butcher in order to ensure ḥalāl 
consumption. The most laborious consumption is performed by Aziz, who only considers meat 
                                                 
49 The idea for the continuum derives from Fischer (2011: 102). His continuum ranges from purism to pragmatism. We 
remodeled it to fit our case study. 
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Figure 1: Ḥalāl continuum 
 
The continuum illustrates that consumption is shaped by accessibility. The limited options are a 
product of the fact that the German ḥalāl economy is located in a majority non-Muslim society, and 
in Leipzig specifically the number of potential consumers in the ḥalāl market is limited. In 
addition, German and EU legislation restrict slaughter methods by making pre-stunning the norm 
and non-stunning the rare exception. Ḥalāl concepts do inform and heavily influence purchase 
decisions, but at the same time the limited options influence individual ḥalāl concepts and, 
ultimately, individual consumption. 
This interplay of accessibility and personal ḥalāl conception can be seen clearly in the case of 
Alaa and Azme. They recount how they reassessed their concept of ḥalāl after moving to Germany. 
Previously they had considered meat by pre-stunned animals ḥarām; but in Germany they revised 
their convictions and concluded that the principle of animal welfare, which is the core argument of 
the Animal Welfare Act, is reasonable and also compliant with their understanding of the Islamic 
precept of animal welfare. Rashid is concerned with taking responsibility for his actions, critically 
assessing the impact his consumption has on the environment and other people. Based on his 
personal ḥalāl concept, his critical assessment of halal products makes up for ḥalāl certificates 
issued by German businesses that do not incorporate this holistic approach. To Hamed, regular 
meat – with the exception of pork – can be considered ḥalāl because to him, the German slaughter 
regulations are in line with the šarīʿa. His personal ḥalāl concept does not limit the accessibility of 
meat consumption.  
Another factor besides accessibility that may inform an individual’s purchasing criteria is the 
time that the person has already spent in Germany. Aziz follows the strictest ḥalāl concept and is 
the person who has been living in Germany for the longest time among our interlocutors. He has, 
therefore, witnessed changes in majority society’s perception of Muslims as well as several food 
safety scandals. On the other hand, the two married couples with children follow the ḥalāl concept 
that is easiest in terms of feasibility and they trust ḥalāl certificates. Our interlocutors base their 
trust mechanisms on different forms of religious authority. Alaa and Azme, Fatma and Tarik, 
20 
  
Hamed, and Aziz trust their own expertise whereas Rashid, Alaa and Azme, and Fatma and Tarik 
(also) trust the Islamic butcher/vendor as an authority. Hamed is himself an imam and Islamic 
theologian, whereas Alaa and Azme, and Fatma and Tarik studied at Al-Azhar University. Aziz 
described studying Koran exegesis with a ʿālim in Leipzig.  
The issue of transparency concerning ḥalāl certification, ḥalāl certification bodies, and 
monitoring mechanisms leaves two of our interlocutors mistrusting products labeled as ḥalāl. To 
Rashid, ḥalāl certification in Germany is not monitored well enough to ensure adherence to the 
moral and ethical criteria that ḥalāl consumption entails for him: capitalist principles supersede the 
meaning behind the word. Instead, personal relationships with butchers or shops owners are the 
criteria on which Rashid bases his trust in the ‘ḥalālness’ of meat. The ḥalāl certification in this 
case takes the shape not of a materialized logo but of a personal assurance: the Islamic butcher 
vouches with his Muslimhood. Thus, trust in ḥalāl is not linked to a logo from an ḥalāl certification 
bodies. This trust is not general; rather, it is confined to particular spaces and personal 
relationships.50 Aziz’s perception of ḥalāl is more restrictive than the certification standards of 
most ḥalāl certification bodies: Ḥalāl-certified poultry sold in mainstream supermarkets is stunned 
before slaughter – hence the ḥalāl certificate does not carry any meaning for him. The gradual 
emptying of meaning connected with the ḥalāl designation in the cases of Rashid and Aziz is due 
to a perceived ḥalāl frontier (Fischer 2011). They do not trust the ‘ḥalālness’ of a ḥalāl-certified 
product because they cannot possibly know whether their definition of ḥalāl is covered by the ḥalāl 
standard a product is certified by. Fischer states that “trust and personal relationships are essential 
in the understanding and practice of ḥalāl certification” (2011: 96). As discussed above, there is no 
central religious authority in Germany to monitor ḥalāl certification bodies. Some of them are well 
connected, and some are accredited by institutions and countries outside the EU. Nevertheless, 
transparency and information are scarce, leaving ḥalāl at risk of being further hollowed out. 
 
6. Conclusion and Outlook 
 
In the case study in Leipzig, our interlocutors showed agency in the shape of negotiation processes 
when confronted with the challenge of living a ḥalāl-compliant life in Germany. The institutional 
structures limit their consumption behavior, leading them to develop different purchasing strategies 
that relied on various forms of religious authority. The lack of centralized religious authority is also 
evident in the ḥalāl industry. In Germany, the ḥalāl market incorporates a wide variety of actors 
who claim authority over ḥalāl and ‘ḥalālness’, which directly impacts Muslims’ ḥalāl 
consumption. The social demographics of Leipzig as part of Eastern Germany present further 
challenges for a ḥalāl-compliant lifestyle, since Muslim infrastructure has only begun to establish 
itself there since the 1990s. Nevertheless, there is already a notable public presence of ḥalāl in the 
urban landscape, which offers guidance and orientation but also triggers skeptical questioning 
about the meaning of the word in a commercial context. 
Reflecting on the findings from the case study in Leipzig, further questions arise. In light of the 
personal trust relationships between (Muslim) consumers and (Muslim) vendors/butchers, what 
                                                 
50 During our research, we encountered what we refer to as “hidden ḥalāl networks”. By this we mean restaurants and 
cafés that are considered ḥalāl by interlocutors but are not openly labeled as such. The knowledge about these places is 
transmitted via networks. This leaves open the question of why the labeling happens informally and what role the 
owners/employees of these places play in creating trust. 
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factors create trust other than religious affiliation? What role does nationality/descent or language 
play, for instance? Are ḥalāl consumption and doing ḥalāl business gendered activities?  
There are other Muslim spaces in Leipzig besides Eisenbahnstraße. Time, however, is an 
important variable here. The infrastructure on Eisenbahnstraße has had more time to grow and to 
establish itself than in other locations in the city. 
The dense public presence of ḥalāl on Eisenbahnstraße is unique in Leipzig, and can thus shed 
light on likely future developments. It is a place of competition between different Islamic butchers 
who sell ḥalāl meat. This suggests that inter-Muslim close monitoring of the quality of ḥalāl meat 
might leave less space for inaccuracy. In the future, the networks of entrepreneurs and their 
experiences may bear fruits elsewhere in the city or the state. The establishment of a public 
presence of ḥalāl is an act of claiming space and belonging. At the same time, the increased 
visibility of ḥalāl in the public space may (and in fact already has) become, for some, an indicator 
of Muslim/Islam as someone/something not belonging to Germany. Connecting food to a sense of 
belonging is nothing new in Germany. Right-wing groups have considered ḥalāl a sign of 
foreignness since the 1990s/2000s, when the spread of snack bars selling döner kebab and the 
consumption of ḥalāl döner was constructed as something foreign and un-German and challenged 
with the motto “Bockwurst statt Döner” (“sausages, not döner kebab”; Möhring 2012: 449). 
Nevertheless, ḥalāl has nowadays become increasingly visible in the shape of stickers printed on 
shop fronts and certificates and documents indicating the ‘ḥalālness’ of meat. This increased 
availability and visibility in the public sphere presents a greater scope for racist constructions 
surrounding Muslims and Islam in Germany. This holds especially true in Saxony, where the far-
right movement Pegida is mobilizing many people “against the Islamization of the Occident” and 
the right-wing AfD party (Alternative für Deutschland, or “Alternative for Germany”) won three 
direct mandates in the federal parliamentary election in 2017 and 38 of 119 seats in the Saxony 
state parliament in 2019 (Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen 2017, 2019). Nearly half of the Muslims 
living in Saxony reside in Leipzig and have relatively easy access to Islamic butcher shops. Others, 
who live in cities like Dresden, Chemnitz, and Riesa or in rural areas, have more limited access to 
ḥalāl consumption options. Shifting the focus from urban to rural areas would give different 
insights into Muslim life in a majority non-Muslim society.  
Outside of Muslim communities, awareness of the concept of ḥalāl as a set of dietary rules has 
become widespread. In the context of a majority non-Muslim country, proclaiming one’s affiliation 
to Islam or being assigned a Muslim identity from the outside can create social pressure regarding 
one’s lifestyle choices. One of the authors of this paper, Abdelghafar, notes that as a result of just 
being perceived as a Muslim, he has often been given unsolicited advice on whether or not a 
product is ḥalāl. In this context, having a Muslim identity implies eating ḥalāl. Thus, as soon as a 
religious affiliation is proclaimed or perceived, social control may start. This control is not exerted 
only by non-Muslims, but can be found in the Muslim community as well.  
Considering the meaninglessness of the ḥalāl certificate for two of our interlocutors, the issue of 
the commercialization of ḥalāl arises. This leads to a number of research questions, for example: 
What institutional measures would have to be taken by the Islamic organizations in Germany to 
counteract this development? How might it be possible to establish a comprehensive ḥalāl standard 
implemented and monitored by religious authorities? Who should be entrusted with such a task? 






Abd Latif, Ismail, Zainalabidin Mohamed, Juwaidah Sharifuddin, Amin Mahir Abdullah, and 
Mohd Mansor Ismail. 2014. A comparative analysis of global halal certification requirements. 
Journal of Food Products Marketing 20(1): 85–101. 
 
Abou El Fadl, Khaled. 2003. Speaking in God’s name: Islamic law, authority and women. Oxford: 
Oneworld. 
 
Abū Zahra, Muḥammad. 1969. Al-ʿAqīda al-Islāmiyya kamā ǧāʾa bihā al-qurʾān al-karīm. Cairo: 
Majmaʿ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmiyya. 
 
Abū Zaid, Nasr Ḥāmid. 1996. Al-Imām aš-Šāfiʿī wa-taʾsīs al-aydiyūlūǧiyya al-wasaṭiyya. Cairo: 
Maktabat madbūlī.  
 
al-Baihaqī, Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusain b. ʿAlī b. Mūsā. 1994. Sunan al- Baihaqī alkubrā. 
Volume. 9. Mekka: Dār al-Bāz. 
 
al-Māwardī, Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. Ḥabīb al-Baṣrī. 1985. Al-Aḥkām as-sulṯānīya wa-
l-wilāyāt ad-dīnīya. Volume 1. Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmīya. 
 
al-Nīšābūrī, Niẓām al-Dīn al-Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad. 1996. Tafsīr ġarāʾib al-Qurʾān. Volume 3. 
Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmīya. 
 
Albrecht, Sarah. 2018. Dār al-Islām revisited: territoriality in contemporary Islamic legal 
discourse on Muslims in the West. Series: Muslim Minorities. Leiden: Brill. 
 
Amirpul, Katajun. 2006. A doctrine in the making? Velāyat-e faqīh in post-revolutionary Iran. In: 
Gudrun Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke (eds.). Speaking for Islam: religious authorities in Muslim 
societies. Leiden: Brill, pp. 218–240. 
 
An-Naʿim, Abdullahi Ahmed. 2008. Islam and the secular state: negotiating the future of Shariʿa. 
Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press. 
 
Andorfer, Veronika A., and Ulf Liebe. 2013. Consumer behavior in moral markets: on the 
relevance of identity, justice beliefs, social norms, status, and trust in ethical consumption. 
European Sociological Review 29(6): 1251–1265. 
 
Anil, Haluk, Mara Miele, Karen von Holleben, Florence Bergeaud-Blackler, and Antonio Verlade. 
2010. Religious rules and requirements – halal slaughter. DIALREL Reports 1.1.2. Cardiff: School 
of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University. 
http://www.dialrel.eu/images/dialrel_report_halal.pdf (website offline, accessed via 
https://web.archive.org/, on 3 January 2020). 
 
Asad, Muhammad.1980. The Message of The Qur’ān. Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus. 
 
Auda, Jasser. 2018. Rethinking Islamic law in Europe: the concept of the land of Islam. In: 
Mohammed Hashas, Jan Jaap de Ruiter, and Niels Valdemar Vinding (eds.). Imams in Western 
Europe: developments, transformations, and institutional challenges. Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, pp. 39–50.  
 
Bade, Klaus J., and Jochen Oltmer. 2004. Normalfall Migration. ZeitBild 15: 90–96. 
 
Badruldin, Baizuri, Zainalabidin Mohamed, Juwaidah Sharifuddin, Golnaz Rezai, Amin Mahir 
Abdullah, Isamail Abd Latif, and Mohd Ghazali Mohayidin. 2012. Clients’ perception towards 




Bashir, Khaled Ramadan. 2018. Islamic international law: historical foundations and Al-
Shaybani’s Siyar. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Bayat, Masoumeh. 2016. Die politische und mediale Repräsentation in Deutschland lebender 
Muslime: eine Studie am Beispiel der Deutschen Islam Konferenz. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.  
 
Bergeaud-Blackler, Florence. 2016a. The halal certification market in Europe and the world: a first 
panorama. In: Florence Bergeaud-Blackler, Johan Fischer, and John Lever (eds.). Halal matters: 
Islam, politics and markets in global perspective. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 105–126. 
 
Bergeaud-Blackler, Florence. 2016b. Islamizing food: the encounter of market and diasporic 
dynamics. In: Florence Bergeaud-Blackler, Johan Fischer, and John Lever (eds.). Halal matters: 
Islam, politics and markets in global perspective. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 91–104. 
 
Bergeaud-Blackler, Florence. 2016c. Who owns halal? Five international initiatives of halal food 
regulations. In: Florence Bergeaud-Blackler, Johan Fischer, and John Lever (eds.). Halal matters: 
Islam, politics and markets in global perspective. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 192–197. 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991. Language and symbolic power. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Bunt, Gary R. 2003. Islam in the digital space: e-jihad, online fatwas and cyber Islamic 
environments. London: Pluto Press. 
 
Bunt, Gary R. 2009. iMuslims: rewriting the house of Islam. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press. 
 
Bunt, Gary R. 2018. Hashtag Islam: how cyber-Islamic environments are transforming religious 
authority. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Calmard, Jean. 2012. Mollā. In: Encyclopaedia of Islam Online. Second Edition. Leiden: Brill. 
 
Carroll, Jackson W. 1981. Some issues in clergy authority. Special issue in memory of Samuel W. 
Blizzard, Review of Religious Research 23(2): 99–117. 
 
Chbib, Raida. 2011. Einheitliche Repräsentation und muslimische Binnenvielfalt: eine 
datengestützte Analyse der Institutionalisierung des Islam in Deutschland. In: Hendrik Meyer and 
Klaus Schubert (eds.). Politik und Islam. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 87–
112. 
 
Cremer, Hannah. 2016. Die Eisenbahnstraße in Leipzig: ein Ort des muslimischen Lebens? In: 
Marie Hakenberg and Verena Klemm (eds.). Muslime in Sachsen: Geschichten, Fakten, 
Lebenswelten. Leipzig: Edition Leipzig, pp. 62–67. 
 
Deutsche Islam Konferenz. 2012. Bessere Integration von Musliminnen und Muslimen in den 
Arbeitsmarkt. Nuremberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. 
 
Elliesie, Hatem. 2014a. Binnenpluralität des Islamischen Rechts: Diversität religiöser Normativität 
rechtsdogmatisch und -methodisch betrachtet. SFB-Governance Working Paper Series No. 54. 
Berlin: DFG Research Center (SFB) 700 – Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood, pp. 1–26.  
 
Elliesie, Hatem. 2014b. Ǧihād und Gewalt gegen Ungläubige im islamischen Recht. In: Georg 
Plasger und Heinz-Günther Stobbe (eds.). Gewalt gegen Christen: Formen, Gründe, Hintergründe. 
Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, pp. 329–359. 
 
Elliesie, Hatem, and Sarah Armbruster. Forthcoming. Recht gläubig? Schächten auf dem rechts- 
und islamwissenschaftlichen Prüfstand muslimischer Lebenswelten in Deutschland. In: Mirko 
24 
  
Uhlig und Dominique Conte (eds.). Recht gläubig? Kulturwissenschaftliche Perspektiven auf das 
Verhältnis von Religion und rechtlicher Normierung im Alltag. Mainz: Waxmann. 
 
Fischer, Johan. 2011. The halal frontier: Muslim consumers in a globalized market. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Gruner-Domić, Sandra. 1999. Beschäftigung statt Ausbildung: ausländische Arbeiter und 
Arbeiterinnen in der DDR (1961–1989). In: Jan Motte; Rainer Ohliner, and Anne von Oswald 
(eds.). 50 Jahre Bundesrepublik – 50 Jahre Einwanderung: Nachkriegsgeschichte als 
Migrationsgeschichte. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, pp. 215–241. 
 
Hakenberg, Marie, and Verena Klemm. 2016. Muslime in Sachsen: Geschichten, Fakten, 
Lebenswelten. Leipzig: Edition Leipzig. 
 
HalalFocus. 2014. OIC to establish one global halal standard. Available online at: 
https://halalfocus.net/oic-to-establish-on-global-halal-standard/ (accessed on 2 January 2020). 
 
Hallaq, Wael. 2009. An introduction to Islamic law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Haug, Sonja, Stephanie Müssig, and Anja Stichs. 2009. Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland. 
Report commissioned by the Deutsche Islam Konferenz. Nuremberg: Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge. Zentrum für Türkeistudien und Integrationsforschung (Forschungsbericht 6). 
 
Hefny, Assem. 2010. Hermeneutik, Koraninterpretation und Menschenrechte. In: Hatem Elliesie 
(ed.). Islam und Menschenrechte / Islam and human rights /ناسنلإا قوقح و ملاسلإا. Leipziger 
Beiträge zur Orientforschung, volume 26. Beiträge zum Islamischen Recht VII. Frankfurt a.M: 
Peter Lang, pp. 73–97. 
 
Ibn Qaiyim al-Ǧauzīya, Abū ʿAbdullāh Šams ad-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr b. Aiyūb. 1997. 
Aḥkām ahl aḏ-ḏimma. Volume 2. Beirut: Ramady/Ibn ḥazm. 
 
Kindelberger, Hala, and Kilian Kindelberger. 2007. Herausforderung Integration: Thesen zur 
Migration und Integration von Zuwanderern im Land Brandenburg. Potsdam: Universitätsverlag. 
 
Korioth, Stefan, and Ino Augsberg. 2010. Religion and the secular state in Germany. In: Javier 
Martínez-Torrón and W. Cole Durham, Jr. (eds.). Religion and the secular state / La religion et 
l’État laïque: Interim national reports / Rapports Nationaux Intermédiaires, issued for the 
occasion of the XVIIIth International Congress of Comparative Law, Washington, DC – July 2010. 
Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University, pp. 320–330. 
 
Krämer, Gudrun, and Sabine Schmidtke. 2006. Introduction: religious authority and religious 
authorities in Muslim societies; a critical overview. In: Gudrun Krämer und Sabine Schmidtke 
(eds.). Speaking for Islam: religious authorities in Muslim Societies. Leiden: Brill, pp. 1–14.  
 
Krawietz, Birgit. 2011. Šarīʿa. In: Hans D. Betz, Don S. Browning, Bernd Janowski and Eberhard 
Jüngel (eds.). Religion past and present. Leiden: Brill. Available online at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1877-5888_rpp_SIM_025216 (accessed 19 February 2020). 
 
Kühl, Alicia. 2010. Die Eisenbahnstraße Leipzig: vom Arbeiterquartier zum Migrantenviertel. Eine 
Analyse des soziokulturellen Wandels von der Gründerzeit bis heute unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der DDR. Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Müller. 
 
Leimer, Kristin. 2010. Ethnic Business District Leipziger Osten – Eine Betrachtung der 
zwischenbetrieblichen Ebene ethnischer Ökonomien. In: Sebastian Henn and Michael Behling 
(eds.). Aspekte integrierter Stadtteilentwicklung: Ergebnisse und Erfahrungen aus dem Leipziger 




Lemmen, Thomas. 2002. Islamische Vereine und Verbände in Deutschland. Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung. 
 
Lever, Johan, and Mara Miele. 2012. The growth of halal meat markets in Europe: an exploration 
of the supply side theory of religion. Journal of Rural Studies 28: 528–537. 
 
Mandaville, Peter. 2007. Global political Islam. London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Möhring, Maren. 2012. Fremdes Essen: die Geschichte der ausländischen Gastronomie in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag. 
 
Nakyinsige, Khadijah, Yaakob Bin Che Man, and Awis Qurni Sazili. 2012. Halal authenticity 
issues in meat and meat products. Meat Science 91: 207–214. 
 
Perabo, Timon. 2018. Musliminnen und Muslime in ländlichen Räumen in Sachsen, Sachsen-
Anhalt und Thüringen: wie kann die Verwaltung neue Aufgaben gut meistern? Berlin: Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung and Robert Bosch Stiftung. 
 
Peter, Frank. 2006. Individualization and religious authority in Western European Islam. Islam and 
Christian–Muslim Relations 17(1): 105–118. 
 
Ramadan, Tariq. 2001. Muslimsein in Europa: Untersuchung der islamischen Quellen im 
europäischen Kontext. Cologne: MSV-Verlag. 
 
Raza, Farrah. 2018. Accommodating religious slaughter in the UK and Germany: competing 
interests in carving out legal exemptions. Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working 
Paper No. 191. Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. 
 
Regenstein, Joe M., Muhammad M. Chaudry, and Carrie E. Regenstein. 2003. The kosher and 
halal food laws. Comprehensive Reviews in Food Science and Food Safety 2: 111–127. 
 
Robinson, Francis. 1993. Technology and religious change: Islam and the impact of print. Special 
issue: how social, political and cultural information is collected, defined, used and analyzed, 
Modern Asian Studies 27(1): 229–251. 
 
Robinson, Francis. 2009. Crisis of authority: crisis of Islam? Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 
(Third Series) 19(3): 339–354. 
 
Rohe, Mathias. 2016. Der Islam in Deutschland: eine Bestandsaufnahme. Munich: C.H. Beck. 
 
Roy, Olivier. 2004. Globalised Islam: the search for a new Ummah. London: Hurst. 
 
Salim, Abdelghafar. 2018. Einblicke in klassisch islamische Rechtsdiskurse zu ḫamr: ein Beitrag 
zum Verhältnis von Theorie und Praxis. In: Hatem Elliesie, Beate Anam, and Thoralf Hanstein 
(eds.). Islamisches Recht in Wissenschaft und Praxis: Festschrift zu Ehren von Hans-Georg Ebert. 
Frankfurt: Peter Lang, pp. 133–158.  
 
Salvatore, Armando. 2012. The reform project in the emerging public spheres. In: Armando 
Salvatore and Martin Van Bruinessen (eds.). Islam and modernity: key issues and debates. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 185–205.  
 
Schneiders, Thorsten G., and Lamya Kaddor. 2005. Einleitung: Europäische Muslime zwischen 
Glaube und Verfassungstreue. In: Thorsten G. Schneiders and Lamya Kaddor (eds.). Muslime im 
Rechtsstaat. Veröffentlichungen des Centrums für religiöse Studien Münster, volume 3. Münster: 




Stadt Leipzig. 2019. Muslime in Leipzig. Available online at: https://www.leipzig.de/jugend-
familie-und-soziales/auslaender-und-migranten/migration-und-integration/interkulturelles-leipzig/ 
muslime-in-leipzig/ (accessed 2 January 2020). 
 
Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen. 2017. Bundestagswahl 2017. Erstimmenverteilung ausgewählter 
Wahlvorschlagsträger bei der Wahl am 24. September 2017 in den Wahlkreisen des Freistaates 
Sachsen. Available online at: https://www.statistik.sachsen.de/wpr_neu/pkg_s10_ergli_ 
lw.prc_ergli_lw_v2?p_bz_bzid=BW17&p_ebene=SN&p_ort=14&p_art=1 (accessed 2 January 
2020). 
 
Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen. 2019. Mandate im 7. Sächsischen Landtag nach der Wahl am 1. 
September 2019 Endgültiges Ergebnis. Available online at: https://www.wahlen.sachsen.de/ 
download/Landtag/2019_LTW_Mandate_endgueltig.pdf (accessed 3 January 2020). 
 
Stichs, Anja. 2016. Wie viele Muslime leben in Deutschland? Report commissioned by the 
Deutsche Islam Konferenz. Nuremberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge.  
 
Sunier, Thijl. 2018. The making of Islamic authority in Europe. In: Mohammed Hashas, Jan Jaap 
de Ruiter, and Niels Valdemar Vinding (eds.). Imams in Western Europe: developments, 
transformations, and institutional challenges. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 51–
68. 
 
Vajda, Georges, Ignaz Goldziher, and Seeger Adrianus Bonebakker. 2012. Id̲j̲āza. In: 
Encyclopaedia of Islam Online. Second Edition. Leiden: Brill. 
 
Weber, Max. 1980. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie. Edited by 
Johannes Winckelmann. Student’s edition. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.  
 
Zaman, Muhammad Qasim 2009. The ulama and contestations on religious authority. In: Armando 
Salvatore and Martin Van Bruinessen (eds.). Islam and modernity: key issues and debates. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 206–236.  
 
Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. 2012. Modern Islamic thought in a radical age: religious authority 
and internal criticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
